Hi,
If we want to both impute and match, what is the best order for doing these
procedures? There has been some disagreement about this. Is it appropriate
to match on imputed data?
Thanks,
Miya
--
K. Miya Woolfalk
Graduate Student
Harvard University
Government and Social Policy
Hi all,
Here are our title and abstract. We welcome your comments and feedback.
Thanks,
Eunmi & Jiwook
_______________
Jiwook Jung & Eunmi Mun
Title:
Why Do Social Contacts Matter in the Labor Market?
An Employer-side Explanation
Abstract:
Why do job applicants rich in social capital perform better in the labor
market? While Fernandez and his colleagues find that applicants with
employee referrals have a better chance of getting the job, there remains a
concern that the network effect they find is not a causal one; employees may
refer others capable of getting the job even without a referral. Using the
same data, this paper reexamines the effect of referrals using the
counterfactual causality framework. After matching referrals with
non-referrals using a propensity score matching, the analyses still show a
positive effect of referrals on the probability of getting both job
interviews and job offers. In addition, the analyses demonstrate that the
effect of referrals is contingent on the number of job openings. This
finding implies that employers utilize employee referrals as a recruiting
tool, partially explaining the better performance of applicants with
referrals in the job market. We conclude that more studies should be done
about when and how employers may benefit from hiring by referrals.
_________________
Eunmi Mun
Ph.D. Candidate
Harvard University Sociology Dept.
William James Hall 574
Cambridge, MA 02138
Phone (office): 617-496-3695
hello all,
here are the readings for next week.
Paul W. Holland. 1986. Statistics and Causal Inference. Journal of the
American Statistical Association 81: 945-960.
Paul R. Rosenbaum and Donald B. Rubin. 1985. Constructing a Control
Group Using Multivariate Matched Sampling Methods That Incorporate the
Propensity Score. The American Statistician 39: 33-38.
cheers,
Holger
--
Holger Lutz Kern
Graduate Student
Department of Government
Cornell University
Institute for Quantitative Social Science
Harvard University
1737 Cambridge Street N350
Cambridge, MA 02138
www.people.cornell.edu/pages/hlk23
Hi all,
Below is our working abstract and title.
Best,
Hai and Hea Min
Title:
Explaining the Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Competition and the
Negative Effects of Learning, Past Agreements, and Trade Relations
Abstract:
This paper aims to evaluate Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2006)'s
[henceforth, EGS 2006] claim that the spread of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) derives from the international economic competition between
potential host countries. In short, BITs are intergovernmental treaties
that guarantee particular rights for foreign investors in a host country;
the foreign investors, in turn, invest within the host country to-in
principle-fulfill their contracts' requirements. EGS 2006 additionally
argue that learning based on past or current successful investment
experiences plays a positive role with BIT signing. This paper extends EGS
2006's work by using event-history analysis and accounts for diminishing
marginal benefits and country-level variations. The results show that
competition among host countries does increase the likelihood of signing a
BIT. However, contrary to EGS 2006's findings, this paper demonstrates how
learning, the presence of previous BIT agreements, and dyadic trade
relations between the investor and host country negatively impact the
signing of a BIT. We therefore conclusively argue that the evidence
suggests learning cannot be used to explain the global increase of BITs.
