Don't Rule Out "Structure" Just Yet
Revisiting Howard & Roessler's "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes"
Why do some semi-free elections in competitive authoritarian regimes produce liberalizing
outcomes while others do not? Howard & Roessler offer a compelling story that
emphasizes the ability of the opposition to form a coalition. However, a reevaluation of
their empirical evidence reveals a more complex relationship between structural
preconditions and the probability of further liberalization. The opposition's
behavior is more constrained by economic growth and prior experiences with democratization
than implied by Howard and Roessler's theory. We respecify Howard and Roessler's
model to disaggregate their predictor variables' effects. We find that opposition
coalitions are less likely to form: during periods of economic growth, in states with no
prior history of liberal change, and in states with lower levels of opposition
mobilization. Additionally, we examine the counterfactual scenarios Howard & Roessler
pose in constructing their argument. We find their counterfactuals are not reasonable
given their data and suggest modifications that better demonstrate the impact of the above
mentioned variables.