13 May
2003
13 May
'03
6:29 p.m.
I guess he does want *some* theoretical points :-) So how about this:
The most comprehensive evaluation of the resource curse (Ross, 2001) posits
sweeping negative influence of oil on democracy. We debunk the resource
curse theory and argue that resource wealth in fact has a negative
influence on *autocracy*. We argue that oil production is a more
appropriate measure of resource wealth, because the traditional oil exports
measure captures economic reliance on oil, rather than oil wealth per
se. Using an extended version of Ross's data set, we break down the
effects of oil production and exports by region and show that oil greatly
decreases the probability of autocracy in Latin America and fails to affect
regime type in the rest of the world. Finally, we further disaggregate the
effects of oil by country income level and by oil industry ownership type,
and find that oil is detrimental to democracy only in rich countries and in
countries where the oil industry is fully state-owned.
At 05:02 PM 5/13/2003, Gary King wrote:
this is pretty good. the results sound a bit like
'well, they found
something and we find chaos.' can you make some theoretical sense of the
chaos? is there some _single_ alternative theory or perspective that has
as observable implications all the complicated findings you have?
We wish! isn't it powerful enough to debunk a dominant theory? maybe the
point is that there is no universal way in which oil per se affects regime
type...
if you
can find that theory, then you'll have a much more powerful paper.
what does 'significantly associated' mean? it doesn't even say a
direction and certainly has nothing substantive attached to it. you're
writing a substantive paper.
Gary
On Tue, 13 May 2003, Stanislav Markus wrote:
for any last-minute comments, many thanks!
debating between two titles:
"Disaggregating the Resource Curse: The Varying Effects of Oil by
Region, Country Income Level and Oil Industry Ownership"
"Oil As Lubricant for Autocracy? It All Depends - on Region, Income, and
Ownership."
Abstract:
The most comprehensive evaluation of the resource curse (Ross, 2001)
posits sweeping negative influence of oil on democracy. Using a
multinomial logit model and extending Ross's dataset, we demonstrate
that effects of oil on regime are highly contingent on region, per
capita income, and ownership of the oil industry. We find that Latin
America, contrary to the orthodox focus on the Middle East, exhibits the
strongest link between oil and regime - and that oil is a true blessing
for democracy in this region. We show that the negative influence of oil
on democracy occurs where per capita income is high, and where the state
owns the oil facilities. Finally, we provide evidence that not only the
oil exports, but also the oil production for domestic consumption is
significantly associated with regime type, which has direct implications
for the causal mechanism involved.
****************************
Stanislav Markus
Ph.D. Candidate
Harvard University
Department of Government
e: smarkus(a)fas.harvard.edu
t: 617.513.5407
-----Original Message-----
From: gov2001-l-admin(a)fas.harvard.edu
[mailto:gov2001-l-admin@fas.harvard.edu] On Behalf Of Kosuke Imai
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 9:24 AM
To: Yevgeniy Kirpichevsky
Cc: gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
Subject: Re: [gov2001-l] Abstract: Lipscy/Kirpichevsky
much better! some minor suggestions below.
Kosuke
On Mon, 12 May 2003, Yevgeniy Kirpichevsky wrote:
_______________________________________________
gov2001-l mailing list
gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/mailman/listinfo/gov2001-l Divided Government or Protectionist Congress?
Obstacles to delegation of trade policy authority by Congress to the
President.
change the subtitle to "Obstacles to Congressional delegation of ..."
We argue that the effect of divided government on
the US trade policy
is
*conditional* on the free-trade inclinations of
Congress. The
structure
of delegation under the Reciprocal Trade
Authorization Act (RTAA)
causes
the liberal party to delegate *regardless* of the
party identity of
the
President, while the protectionist party is less
likely to delegate to
the President of a different party.
change "liberal party" to "liberal Congress"
change "protectionaist party" to "protectionist Congress"
Our argument clashes with the conventional view,
pioneered by Lohmann
and O'Halloran (1994) who argue that divided government *always*
causes
Congress to delegate less authority to the
executive branch, resulting
in higher tariff rates.
change "Our argument" to "We"
change "clashes with" to "questions"
We find broad support for our proposition in both
Congressional voting
and U.S. tariff rate data.
change to "Our proposition finds broad support in both..."
While Lohmann and O'Halloran's
substantive results disappear after the
addition of recent data to their analysis, our theoretical claims are
supported. We find that, ceteris paribus, when Congress is
protectionist, a change from unified to divided government increases
the
tariff rate by 0.15 percentage points, while a
similar change under a
liberal Congress has virtually no effect.
good. but is your theory supported in the old data before adding more
recent data?
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