12 May
2003
12 May
'03
12:58 p.m.
Hi, all comments are welcome and appreciated.
Thanks, Olivia and Asif.
Title: Lighting the Powderkeg: Why Leaders Initiate International Crises
Do international crises occur because aggressors look for easy gains?
Gelpi and Grieco (2001) argue that potential challengers find democracies
to be easy prey because democratic leaders are more likely to be
inexperienced, and hence more likely to make concessions during
international crises. We correct for time-dependency in Gelpi and
Grieco's dependent variable and argue that they overestimate the
intervening effect of leadership tenure on the probability of crisis.
We argue that if the probability of crisis reflects the challenging
leader's estimation that the defending leader will make concessions,
then it should have a negative effect on the observed length of crises.
We find that increasing the predicted probability of crisis initiation
from 0 to 1 all else being equal increases the predicted length of
the crisis from 93 days to 160 days. Rather than supporting the
argument that challenging leaders make opportunistic judgments about
the defending leaders willingness to concede, our results support
the hypothesis that international crises occur because states
actually have substantive areas of disagreement.
12 May
12 May
6:37 p.m.
good, but the result is subtle. not your fault but of course sizzle is
better when you can find it!
Gary
On Mon, 12 May 2003, Olivia Lau wrote:
Hi, all comments are welcome and appreciated.
Thanks, Olivia and Asif.
Title: Lighting the Powderkeg: Why Leaders Initiate International Crises
Do international crises occur because aggressors look for easy gains?
Gelpi and Grieco (2001) argue that potential challengers find democracies
to be easy prey because democratic leaders are more likely to be
inexperienced, and hence more likely to make concessions during
international crises. We correct for time-dependency in Gelpi and
Grieco's dependent variable and argue that they overestimate the
intervening effect of leadership tenure on the probability of crisis.
We argue that if the probability of crisis reflects the challenging
leader's estimation that the defending leader will make concessions,
then it should have a negative effect on the observed length of crises.
We find that increasing the predicted probability of crisis initiation
from 0 to 1 all else being equal increases the predicted length of
the crisis from 93 days to 160 days. Rather than supporting the
argument that challenging leaders make opportunistic judgments about
the defending leaders willingness to concede, our results support
the hypothesis that international crises occur because states
actually have substantive areas of disagreement.
_______________________________________________
gov2001-l mailing list
gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/mailman/listinfo/gov2001-l
8:06 p.m.
New subject: [gov2001-l] Re: [gov2001-l]Ansell Paxton Abstract
Another abstract for the pyre! Sorry it's too long... any hints on what to cut
ruthlessly?
Ben
You first
No, You
No, I insist
The Simultaneity Dilemma in Explaining Diffusion
Ben Ansell and Nathan A. Paxton
In this paper we show that testing the influence of simultaneous diffusion on
the choice to accept international legal commitments presents enormous
statistical problems. While it is intuitive that a state choosing to sign a
treaty is likely to be heavily influenced by the simultaneous decision of
other states also to sign, attempting to use the amount of other signers as an
independent variable violates the assumption of independence of observations.
We show, using Beth Simmons 2000 APSR article International Law and State
Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, that
tests which neglect the simultaneity dilemma produce non-robust results
regarding regional patterns. We correct for Simmons diffusion variables by
using lagged data and find that previous regional choices have no
statistically or substantively significant effect on current choices to join
Article VIII of the IMF Agreement. We also provide evidence that using linear
functional forms for diffusion covariates may be misleading diffusion
processes often snowball, decelerate, or form an S-shape. We transform
Simmons main diffusion variable into logistic and logarithmic functional
forms and find our regression fits the data better. Finally, we provide
evidence from other treaties about the multiplicity of functional forms that
fit differing diffusion processes and suggest that future work measuring the
effects of previous diffusion should take this variation into account.
9:57 p.m.
New subject: [gov2001-l] Re: [gov2001-l]Ansell Paxton Abstract
You first
No, You
No, I insist
The Simultaneity Dilemma in Explaining Diffusion
Ben Ansell and Nathan A. Paxton
The title isn't really informative. YOu should make your point in the
title.
I think that right now the abstract has too much in it. You need to cut it
and focus on one or two points. If your main point is that the regional
variable doesn't have much influence, then you should say that up front.
To make it short, you can take out the first sentence in particular.
In this paper we show that testing the influence of
simultaneous diffusion on
the choice to accept international legal commitments presents enormous
statistical problems. While it is intuitive that a state choosing to sign a
treaty is likely to be heavily influenced by the simultaneous decision of
other states also to sign, attempting to use the amount of other signers as an
independent variable violates the assumption of independence of observations.
We show, using Beth Simmons 2000 APSR article International Law and State
Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, that
tests which neglect the simultaneity dilemma produce non-robust results
regarding regional patterns. We correct for Simmons diffusion variables by
using lagged data and find that previous regional choices have no
statistically or substantively significant effect on current choices to join
Article VIII of the IMF Agreement. We also provide evidence that using linear
functional forms for diffusion covariates may be misleading diffusion
processes often snowball, decelerate, or form an S-shape. We transform
Simmons main diffusion variable into logistic and logarithmic functional
forms and find our regression fits the data better. Finally, we provide
evidence from other treaties about the multiplicity of functional forms that
fit differing diffusion processes and suggest that future work measuring the
effects of previous diffusion should take this variation into account.
_______________________________________________
gov2001-l mailing list
gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/mailman/listinfo/gov2001-l
10:06 p.m.
New subject: [gov2001-l] Re: [gov2001-l]Ansell Paxton Abstract
I agree with this too and didn't mean to imply anything that would
contradict it. the most important point is that the title and every word
in the abstract be directed toward addressing a single key point.
Gary
On Mon, 12 May 2003, Kosuke Imai wrote:
You first
No, You
No, I insist
The Simultaneity Dilemma in Explaining Diffusion
Ben Ansell and Nathan A. Paxton
The title isn't really informative. YOu should make your point in the
title.
I think that right now the abstract has too much in it. You need to cut it
and focus on one or two points. If your main point is that the regional
variable doesn't have much influence, then you should say that up front.
To make it short, you can take out the first sentence in particular.
In this paper we show that testing the influence
of simultaneous diffusion on
the choice to accept international legal commitments presents enormous
statistical problems. While it is intuitive that a state choosing to sign a
treaty is likely to be heavily influenced by the simultaneous decision of
other states also to sign, attempting to use the amount of other signers as an
independent variable violates the assumption of independence of observations.
We show, using Beth Simmons 2000 APSR article International Law and State
Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, that
tests which neglect the simultaneity dilemma produce non-robust results
regarding regional patterns. We correct for Simmons diffusion variables by
using lagged data and find that previous regional choices have no
statistically or substantively significant effect on current choices to join
Article VIII of the IMF Agreement. We also provide evidence that using linear
functional forms for diffusion covariates may be misleading diffusion
processes often snowball, decelerate, or form an S-shape. We transform
Simmons main diffusion variable into logistic and logarithmic functional
forms and find our regression fits the data better. Finally, we provide
evidence from other treaties about the multiplicity of functional forms that
fit differing diffusion processes and suggest that future work measuring the
effects of previous diffusion should take this variation into account.
_______________________________________________
gov2001-l mailing list
gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/mailman/listinfo/gov2001-l
_______________________________________________
gov2001-l mailing list
gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/mailman/listinfo/gov2001-l
10:05 p.m.
New subject: [gov2001-l] Re: [gov2001-l]Ansell Paxton Abstract
here's how you shorten a long abstract: first you write the one as long as
you want. then go over it word by word and delete every word you can. do
not start deleting whole sections or even sentences unless its obvious you
can. usually you can combine sentences and delete parenthetical phrases
and such to get the count down. your goal is to get your key ideas in
there. so for example, the first three words "in this paper" can be
deleted since its obvious. there are lots of other words in there that
could go to. give it a try...
Gary
On Mon, 12 May 2003, Benjamin William Ansell wrote:
Another abstract for the pyre! Sorry it's too
long... any hints on what
to cut ruthlessly?
Ben
You first
No, You
No, I insist
The Simultaneity Dilemma in Explaining Diffusion
Ben Ansell and Nathan A. Paxton
In this paper we show that testing the influence of simultaneous
diffusion on the choice to accept international legal commitments
presents enormous statistical problems. While it is intuitive that a
state choosing to sign a treaty is likely to be heavily influenced by
the simultaneous decision of other states also to sign, attempting to
use the amount of other signers as an independent variable violates the
assumption of independence of observations. We show, using Beth
Simmons 2000 APSR article International Law and State Behavior:
Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, that tests
which neglect the simultaneity dilemma produce non-robust results
regarding regional patterns. We correct for Simmons diffusion variables
by using lagged data and find that previous regional choices have no
statistically or substantively significant effect on current choices to
join Article VIII of the IMF Agreement. We also provide evidence that
using linear functional forms for diffusion covariates may be misleading
diffusion processes often snowball, decelerate, or form an
S-shape. We transform Simmons main diffusion variable into logistic
and logarithmic functional forms and find our regression fits the data
better. Finally, we provide evidence from other treaties about the
multiplicity of functional forms that fit differing diffusion processes
and suggest that future work measuring the effects of previous diffusion
should take this variation into account.
_______________________________________________
gov2001-l mailing list
gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/mailman/listinfo/gov2001-l
9:47 p.m.
Overall, the abstract is well-written although the finding seems a
bit weak. My comments are below...
Kosuke
On Mon, 12 May 2003, Olivia Lau wrote:
Title: Lighting the Powderkeg: Why Leaders Initiate
International Crises
Do international crises occur because aggressors look for easy gains?
Gelpi and Grieco (2001) argue that potential challengers find democracies
to be easy prey because democratic leaders are more likely to be
inexperienced, and hence more likely to make concessions during
international crises. We correct for time-dependency in Gelpi and
Grieco's dependent variable and argue that they overestimate the
intervening effect of leadership tenure on the probability of crisis.
Maybe you want to say a bit more about how to correct for time-depenency?
We argue that if the probability of crisis reflects
the challenging
leader's estimation that the defending leader will make concessions,
then it should have a negative effect on the observed length of crises.
We find that increasing the predicted probability of crisis initiation
from 0 to 1 all else being equal increases the predicted length of
the crisis from 93 days to 160 days.
The second sentence should come before the first. And, then explain why
this contradicts with the expectation of the theory.
Rather than supporting the argument that challenging
leaders make
opportunistic judgments about the defending leaders willingness to
concede, our results support the hypothesis that international crises
occur because states actually have substantive areas of disagreement.
The last line should be your conclusion, but do you have any direct
evidence to support it?
Kosuke
11:53 p.m.
New subject: [gov2001-l] Abstract: Lipscy/Kirpichevsky
all comments appreciated. Thanks!
-y and p
Divided Government or Protectionist Congress?
Obstacles to delegation of trade policy authority by Congress to the
President.
We argue that the effect of divided government on the US trade policy is
*conditional* on the free-trade inclinations of Congress. The structure
of delegation under the Reciprocal Trade Authorization Act (RTAA) causes
the liberal party to delegate *regardless* of the party identity of the
President, while the protectionist party is less likely to delegate to the
President of a different party.
Our argument clashes with the conventional view, pioneered by Lohmann and
O'Halloran (1994) who argue that divided government *always* causes
Congress to delegate less authority to the executive branch, resulting in
higher tariff rates.
We find broad support for our proposition in both Congressional voting and
U.S. tariff rate data. While Lohmann and O'Halloran's substantive results
disappear after the addition of recent data to their analysis, our
theoretical claims are supported. We find that, ceteris paribus, when
Congress is protectionist, a change from unified to divided government
increases the tariff rate by 0.15 percentage points, while a similar
change under a liberal Congress has virtually no effect.
13 May
13 May
7:22 a.m.
New subject: [gov2001-l] Abstract: Lipscy/Kirpichevsky
very good. i would make clear that you find evidence for your view even
in their data, before adding new data.
i would be slightly inclined to suggest that you make clear earlier on in
the abstract that you're taking on L&O94, but you do get there eventually
(hence the word slightly!). the reason for my suggestion is that the
importance of your work only becomes clear when you say that your findings
question the work of a leading article.
Gary
On Mon, 12 May 2003, Yevgeniy Kirpichevsky wrote:
all comments appreciated. Thanks! -y and p
Divided Government or Protectionist Congress? Obstacles to delegation
of trade policy authority by Congress to the President.
We argue that the effect of divided government on the US trade policy is
*conditional* on the free-trade inclinations of Congress. The structure
of delegation under the Reciprocal Trade Authorization Act (RTAA) causes
the liberal party to delegate *regardless* of the party identity of the
President, while the protectionist party is less likely to delegate to
the President of a different party. Our argument clashes with the
conventional view, pioneered by Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) who argue
that divided government *always* causes Congress to delegate less
authority to the executive branch, resulting in higher tariff rates.
We find broad support for our proposition in both Congressional voting
and U.S. tariff rate data. While Lohmann and O'Halloran's substantive
results disappear after the addition of recent data to their analysis,
our theoretical claims are supported. We find that, ceteris paribus,
when Congress is protectionist, a change from unified to divided
government increases the tariff rate by 0.15 percentage points, while a
similar change under a liberal Congress has virtually no effect.
_______________________________________________ gov2001-l mailing list
gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/mailman/listinfo/gov2001-l
9:23 a.m.
New subject: [gov2001-l] Abstract: Lipscy/Kirpichevsky
much better! some minor suggestions below.
Kosuke
On Mon, 12 May 2003, Yevgeniy Kirpichevsky wrote:
Divided Government or Protectionist Congress?
Obstacles to delegation of trade policy authority by Congress to the
President.
change the subtitle to "Obstacles to Congressional delegation of ..."
We argue that the effect of divided government on the
US trade policy is
*conditional* on the free-trade inclinations of Congress. The structure
of delegation under the Reciprocal Trade Authorization Act (RTAA) causes
the liberal party to delegate *regardless* of the party identity of the
President, while the protectionist party is less likely to delegate to
the President of a different party.
change "liberal party" to "liberal Congress"
change "protectionaist party" to "protectionist Congress"
Our argument clashes with the conventional view,
pioneered by Lohmann
and O'Halloran (1994) who argue that divided government *always* causes
Congress to delegate less authority to the executive branch, resulting
in higher tariff rates.
change "Our argument" to "We"
change "clashes with" to "questions"
We find broad support for our proposition in both
Congressional voting
and U.S. tariff rate data.
change to "Our proposition finds broad support in both..."
While Lohmann and O'Halloran's substantive
results disappear after the
addition of recent data to their analysis, our theoretical claims are
supported. We find that, ceteris paribus, when Congress is
protectionist, a change from unified to divided government increases the
tariff rate by 0.15 percentage points, while a similar change under a
liberal Congress has virtually no effect.
good. but is your theory supported in the old data before adding more
recent data?
12:15 p.m.
New subject: [gov2001-l] Abstract: Markus/Popova
for any last-minute comments, many thanks!
debating between two titles:
"Disaggregating the Resource Curse: The Varying Effects of Oil by
Region, Country Income Level and Oil Industry Ownership"
"Oil As Lubricant for Autocracy? It All Depends - on Region, Income, and
Ownership."
Abstract:
The most comprehensive evaluation of the resource curse (Ross, 2001)
posits sweeping negative influence of oil on democracy. Using a
multinomial logit model and extending Ross's dataset, we demonstrate
that effects of oil on regime are highly contingent on region, per
capita income, and ownership of the oil industry. We find that Latin
America, contrary to the orthodox focus on the Middle East, exhibits the
strongest link between oil and regime - and that oil is a true blessing
for democracy in this region. We show that the negative influence of oil
on democracy occurs where per capita income is high, and where the state
owns the oil facilities. Finally, we provide evidence that not only the
oil exports, but also the oil production for domestic consumption is
significantly associated with regime type, which has direct implications
for the causal mechanism involved.
****************************
Stanislav Markus
Ph.D. Candidate
Harvard University
Department of Government
e: smarkus(a)fas.harvard.edu
t: 617.513.5407
-----Original Message-----
From: gov2001-l-admin(a)fas.harvard.edu
[mailto:gov2001-l-admin@fas.harvard.edu] On Behalf Of Kosuke Imai
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 9:24 AM
To: Yevgeniy Kirpichevsky
Cc: gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
Subject: Re: [gov2001-l] Abstract: Lipscy/Kirpichevsky
much better! some minor suggestions below.
Kosuke
On Mon, 12 May 2003, Yevgeniy Kirpichevsky wrote:
Divided Government or Protectionist Congress?
Obstacles to delegation of trade policy authority by Congress to the
President.
change the subtitle to "Obstacles to Congressional delegation of ..."
We argue that the effect of divided government on the
US trade policy
is
*conditional* on the free-trade inclinations of
Congress. The
structure
of delegation under the Reciprocal Trade Authorization
Act (RTAA)
causes
the liberal party to delegate *regardless* of the
party identity of
the
President, while the protectionist party is less
likely to delegate to
the President of a different party.
change "liberal party" to "liberal Congress"
change "protectionaist party" to "protectionist Congress"
Our argument clashes with the conventional view,
pioneered by Lohmann
and O'Halloran (1994) who argue that divided government *always*
causes
Congress to delegate less authority to the executive
branch, resulting
in higher tariff rates.
change "Our argument" to "We"
change "clashes with" to "questions"
We find broad support for our proposition in both
Congressional voting
and U.S. tariff rate data.
change to "Our proposition finds broad support in both..."
While Lohmann and O'Halloran's substantive
results disappear after the
addition of recent data to their analysis, our theoretical claims are
supported. We find that, ceteris paribus, when Congress is
protectionist, a change from unified to divided government increases
the
tariff rate by 0.15 percentage points, while a similar
change under a
liberal Congress has virtually no effect.
good. but is your theory supported in the old data before adding more
recent data?
_______________________________________________
gov2001-l mailing list
gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/mailman/listinfo/gov2001-l
5:02 p.m.
New subject: [gov2001-l] Abstract: Markus/Popova
this is pretty good. the results sound a bit like 'well, they found
something and we find chaos.' can you make some theoretical sense of the
chaos? is there some _single_ alternative theory or perspective that has
as observable implications all the complicated findings you have? if you
can find that theory, then you'll have a much more powerful paper.
what does 'significantly associated' mean? it doesn't even say a
direction and certainly has nothing substantive attached to it. you're
writing a substantive paper.
Gary
On Tue, 13 May 2003, Stanislav Markus wrote:
for any last-minute comments, many thanks!
debating between two titles:
"Disaggregating the Resource Curse: The Varying Effects of Oil by
Region, Country Income Level and Oil Industry Ownership"
"Oil As Lubricant for Autocracy? It All Depends - on Region, Income, and
Ownership."
Abstract:
The most comprehensive evaluation of the resource curse (Ross, 2001)
posits sweeping negative influence of oil on democracy. Using a
multinomial logit model and extending Ross's dataset, we demonstrate
that effects of oil on regime are highly contingent on region, per
capita income, and ownership of the oil industry. We find that Latin
America, contrary to the orthodox focus on the Middle East, exhibits the
strongest link between oil and regime - and that oil is a true blessing
for democracy in this region. We show that the negative influence of oil
on democracy occurs where per capita income is high, and where the state
owns the oil facilities. Finally, we provide evidence that not only the
oil exports, but also the oil production for domestic consumption is
significantly associated with regime type, which has direct implications
for the causal mechanism involved.
****************************
Stanislav Markus
Ph.D. Candidate
Harvard University
Department of Government
e: smarkus(a)fas.harvard.edu
t: 617.513.5407
-----Original Message-----
From: gov2001-l-admin(a)fas.harvard.edu
[mailto:gov2001-l-admin@fas.harvard.edu] On Behalf Of Kosuke Imai
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 9:24 AM
To: Yevgeniy Kirpichevsky
Cc: gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
Subject: Re: [gov2001-l] Abstract: Lipscy/Kirpichevsky
much better! some minor suggestions below.
Kosuke
On Mon, 12 May 2003, Yevgeniy Kirpichevsky wrote:
Divided Government or Protectionist Congress?
Obstacles to delegation of trade policy authority by Congress to the
President.
change the subtitle to "Obstacles to Congressional delegation of ..."
We argue that the effect of divided government on
the US trade policy
is
*conditional* on the free-trade inclinations of
Congress. The
structure
of delegation under the Reciprocal Trade
Authorization Act (RTAA)
causes
the liberal party to delegate *regardless* of the
party identity of
the
President, while the protectionist party is less
likely to delegate to
the President of a different party.
change "liberal party" to "liberal Congress"
change "protectionaist party" to "protectionist Congress"
Our argument clashes with the conventional view,
pioneered by Lohmann
and O'Halloran (1994) who argue that divided government *always*
causes
Congress to delegate less authority to the
executive branch, resulting
in higher tariff rates.
change "Our argument" to "We"
change "clashes with" to "questions"
We find broad support for our proposition in both
Congressional voting
and U.S. tariff rate data.
change to "Our proposition finds broad support in both..."
While Lohmann and O'Halloran's
substantive results disappear after the
addition of recent data to their analysis, our theoretical claims are
supported. We find that, ceteris paribus, when Congress is
protectionist, a change from unified to divided government increases
the
tariff rate by 0.15 percentage points, while a
similar change under a
liberal Congress has virtually no effect.
good. but is your theory supported in the old data before adding more
recent data?
_______________________________________________
gov2001-l mailing list
gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/mailman/listinfo/gov2001-l
_______________________________________________
gov2001-l mailing list
gov2001-l(a)fas.harvard.edu
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/mailman/listinfo/gov2001-l
7677
days inactive
7678
days old
gov2001@lists.gking.harvard.edu
11 comments
6 participants
participants (6)
-
ansell＠fas.harvard.edu -
Gary King -
kimai＠fas.harvard.edu -
kirpich＠fas.harvard.edu -
olau＠fas.harvard.edu -
smarkus＠fas.harvard.edu